Guilty for Having Done Nothing: Passive Past Owners Face CERCLA Liability by Lee, Lisa A.
Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law 
Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review 
Volume 1 
Issue 2 Fall 1993 
Article 8 
1993 
Guilty for Having Done Nothing: Passive Past Owners Face 
CERCLA Liability 
Lisa A. Lee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lisa A. Lee, Guilty for Having Done Nothing: Passive Past Owners Face CERCLA Liability, 1 Mo. Envtl. L. & 
Pol'y Rev. 88 (1993) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl/vol1/iss2/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law by an 
authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact bassettcw@missouri.edu. 




by Lisa A. Lee
Passive past owners (PPOs) who onceowned contaminated property and whodid not contribute to or even know of
the contamination may be potentially re-
sponsible parties (PRPs) under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).2
As a PRP, the PPO can be responsible for
thousands or even millions of dollars of
cleanup costs.3 So holds the Nurad court.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Nurad, Inc. (Nurad), the current owner of
contaminated land, was required by the
Maryland Department of the Environment to
remove underground storage tanks (USTs)
and the hazardous wastes they contained.'
Nurad subsequently sued previous owners
for reimbursement of costs sustained.s
From 1905 to 1963, the property was
owned by William E. Hooper & Sons Co.
(Hooper).6 Prior to 1935, Hooper installed
USTs to store mineral spirits for use in its
textile finishing plant.' Hooper used these
USTs until 1962 when it shutdown the plant
and abandoned the USTs which contained
unused mineral spirits.8 In 1963, Hooper
sold the property to Property Investors, Inc.,
whose president and principal shareholder
was Frank Nicoll.' Property Investors and its
successor, Monumental Enterprises, Inc.,
leased to various tenants.' 0 Neither Property
Investors, Monumental Enterprises nor any
of their tenants used the USTs." In 1976,
Monumental Enterprises sold to Kenneth
Mumaw, who subdivided the property and
sold a portion of it to Nurad.12 Nurad
manufactured antennae on the property and
never used the USTs.1a
In 1987, the Maryland Department of the
Environment required Nurad to remove the
tanks and clean up the released mineral
spirits.14 In this cleanup, Nurad incurred
response costs and, in 1990, filed this suit
seeking reimbursement under CERCLA for
$226,000 in cleanup costs from former
owners Hooper, Nicoll, Mumaw and Monu-
mental Enterprises."s
The district court held that Hooper alone
was liable to Nurad for reimbursement under
CERCLA'6 because the other former owners
were neither "operators" nor "owners" at
the time of disposal.17  Contrary to the
holding of the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Waste Indus., a pre-CERCLA
action,'" the Nurad district court held that
"disposal" required affirmative action and
that only Hooper, as the original owner,
actively released hazardous wastes at the
site.19 The district court held that defining
disposal as including passive migration was
necessary prior to the enactment of CERCLA
to close a loophole in the statutory scheme of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) and preserve the govemment's
ability to force cleanups.20 However, the
court noted that this expansive definition
was not necessary in this CERCLA action
because all prior owners were defendants to
this suit and, in some cases, liable for costs
under other CERCLA provisions.21 Thus,
the district court granted summary judgment
against Hooper and in favor of the other
defendants." Both Nurad and Hooper ap-
1 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992).
2 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
3 In fiscal year 1992, the Department of Justice recovered $2 billion from civil and criminal penalties, Superfund cost recoveries, and natural resource damages from
enforcement of environmental laws. U.S. Department of Justice, Environmentand Natural Resources Division: Department of Justice Announces $2 BillionYearfor Environmental
Enforcement (October 29, 1992), 1992 WL355365 (D.O.J.), *1. E.P.A. cleanup cost recoveries under Superfund alone amounted to $202,967,554. Id. at *2. Court-ordered
cleanups by private parties amounted to $761,904,116. Id. A Superfund lawsuit is filed every two and one half days of the year. Id.
4 Nurad, 966 F.2d at 840.
5 Id. at 840.
6 Id. Lawrence L Hooper and James E. Hooper, Jr. were also sued as directors of the Hooper Co. As their liability is not at issue in this article, "Hooper" as used in this
article refers only to the Hooper Co. as a corporation, and not to Lawrence or James Hooper. The mineral spirits disposed of at the site are designated as a hazardous substance
under § 102 of CERCLA and 40 C.F.R § 300.5 (1993).








15 Id. at 841. Nurad also sued the previous tenants and James and Lawrence Hooper, shareholders and directors of the Hooper Company. Id. These suits, however, are
not the ubject of this note and the issues surrounding them will not be discussed further. This note will be limited to discussion of the suit against the former owners of the property
and, more particularly, to the issue of liability based solely upon passive migration of hazardous wastes at the time of ownership.
16 Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 22 EnvtL L Rep. 20079, 20082 (D. Md. 1991).
17 Id. at 20088.
18 Id. at 20087 (distinguishing United States v. Waste Indus., 734 F.2d 159, 164-65 (4th Cir. 1984)). See infra, text accompanying notes 66-71.
19 Id. at 20087.
20 Nurad, 22 Envl. L Rep. at 20087.
21 Id. at 20087.
22 Id. at 20088.
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pealed.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the grant of
summary judgment against Hooper, but re-
versed the district court's denial of Nurad's
motion for summary judgment as to
Mumaw.24 The court held that "disposal"
under CERCLA is not limited to active con-
duct, but includes passive migration, such as
"leaking," under the language of the statute,
circuit precedent, and policy considerations
of CERCLA.25 Thus, any owner at the time
of passive migration of contaminants is strictly
liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA.2 6
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A) The Statute
CERCLA subjects certain governmental
and private parties to liability for cleanup
costs associated with the release or threat-
ened release of hazardous substances.? A
prima facie case under CERCLA has four
elements: (1) the site is a "facility" (2) on
which a "release" or "threatened release" of
hazardous substances has occurred (3) which
caused the plaintiff to incur response costs
for cleanup and (4) the defendants are PRPs
under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).' PRPs fall into
four categories under § 9607(a): (1) the
owner and operator of a facility; (2) "any
person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of;" (3) any person who ar-
ranges for disposal, treatment or transporta-
tion of hazardous substances; and (4) any
personwho transports hazardous substances
to any site selected by such person.'
According to the statute, a release or
threatened release alone is sufficient to hold
a present owner liable; a past owner is liable
only if disposal occurred during the time of
ownership. The additional requirement of
disposal in subsection 2 creates the possibil-
ity of a PPO, who would not have liability
absent affirmative conduct?
The definitions of "release" and "disposal"
thus become important. CERCLA defines
"disposal" by incorporating by reference the
definition outlined in the Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act, more commonly known as the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) .3 RCRA defines "disposal" as:
the discharge, deposit, injection,
dumping, spilling, leaking, or plac-
ing of any solid waste or hazardous
waste into or on any land or water
so that such waste or hazardous
waste or any constituent thereof
may enter the environment or be
emitted into the air or discharged
into any waters, including ground
waters.32
"Release," as defined by 42 U.S.C. §
9601(22) includes all of these components
as well as "escaping" and "leaching."3 The
addition of these two criteria, neither of
which are associated with active human
conduct, may indicate Congressional intent
that disposal include only events of direct
human origin, while release include both
events resulting from direct human action
and those without such involvement.' This
"intent," however, is ambiguous at best,
leaving room for disagreement on PPO li-
ability.3
Further, the definition of "disposal" re-
quires that the event be one by which con-
taminants may "enter the environment or be
emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters..."' This definitional wording con-
templates active conduct. "Release," in
contrast, requires spilling, leaking, etc. sim-
ply "into the environment."37 This defini-
tional difference may indicate that disposal
does not include passive migration, although
release does.3
CERCLA provides PRPs with only limited
defenses. Two of these defenses may indi-
rectly illuminate Congressional intent as to
PPO liability: (1) the third party defense
provision of § 9607(b)(3) and § 9601(35)?
and (2) the de minimis settlement provision
of § 96 2 2 (g)(1).4
Section 9607(b)(3) provides that a PRP is
not liable if: (1) the release was caused solely
by an unrelated third party whose act or
omission did not occur due to a contractual
relationship with the PRP and (2) the PRP
can establish that he exercised due care with
respect to the hazardous substance and took
precautions against foreseeable harm caused
by the third party.4 '
The 1986 amendment to § 9601(35)
explains that "contractual relationship" in
§ 9607(b)(3) can mean land contracts or
23 Nurad, 966 F.2d at 841.
24 Id. Frank Nicoll did not move for summary judgment and, thus, is not a party to the appeal. Id. at n.1.
25 Id. at 845.
26 Id. at 840.
27 See Quinn Scallon, Hazardous Waste: Liability of Predecessors in Title, 29 SAN DIEO L REv. 93, 97-8 (1992).
28 CPC Intl, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783,786 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
29 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
30 J.B. Ruhl, The Plight of the Passive Past Owner: Defining the Limits of Superfund Liability, 45 S.W. LJ. 1129, 1133 (1991).31 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
32 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).
33 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988).
34 Ruhl, supra, note 30, at 1134.
35 See generallyFrank P. Grad,A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability (Superfund)Act of 1980, 8Coum.J. Ermn.. L 1 (1982).
36 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) as incorporated into CERCLA through 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29).
37 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
38 See United States v. Petersen Sand and Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (N.D. Il. 1992).
39 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35).
40 42 U.S.C. § 962 2(g)(1).
41 A PRP will not be liable if the release was caused solely by "an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act
or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly. with the defendant... if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable
acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 9607(bX3).
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deeds unless the disposal occurred before
the defendant acquired the land.42 The PRP
must also establish one of the following: that
at the time of acquisition, the PRP did not
know and had no reason to know of the
contamination; that the PRP is a govern-
mental entity which acquired the land by any
type of involuntary transfer, including emi-
nent domain; or that the PRP acquired the
facility through inheritance or bequest.4
It has been argued that the provision in §
9601(35), "theinnocentpurchaserdefense,"
indicates that PPOs are not PRPs under
CERCLA." First, if PPOs were PRPs under
CERCLA, the distinction between present
owners in § 9607(a)(1) and past owners in §
9607(a)(2) would be superfluous, as §
9601(35) "would provide the distinction
through the definition of the defense."45
Second, § 9601(35)(C) indicates that the
provisions of § 9601(35) apply only to present
owners.46 If PPOs were PRPs under
CERCLA, it seems logical that the defense
would apply equally to both.47 The section is
intended to exclude from liability those who
acquired the property after contamination
and were unaware of the contamination. If
disposal is given passive content, that plain
purpose would be denied."
Third, the statutory reference to a period
"after" disposal which is "the subject of" (i.e.
during) a release, seems to indicate that
disposal "refers to a discrete human act with
a discrete ending." 49
Finally, § 9601(35)(A) likens disposal to
placement, which requires active conduct.so
The de minimis settlement provision of §
9622(g)(1) also indicates that PPOs are not
PRPs because if PPOs are PRPs, de minimis
settlementwould be available onlyto present
owners and not to PPOs under the terms of
the statute.s" The de minimis settlement
provision allows a PRP to settle if the settle-
ment involves only a minor portion of the
response costs at the facility and either (1) the
amount and effects of hazardous substances
contributed by the PRP are minimal in com-
parison with other hazardous substances at
the facility, or (2) the PRP owns the real
property where the facility is located and did
not create or contribute to the contamina-
tion.s2
Passive past owners thus could prove that
they did not create or contribute to the
contamination, but could not meet the con-
dition of Subsection (B)(i), which by its terms
applies only to the "owner of the real prop-
erty," presumably the present owner.0 Pas-
sive past owners and present owners both
can seek settlement under § 9622(g)(1)(A),
but only present owners could seek settle-
ment under § 9622(g)(1)(B).M
Both the de minimis settlement provision
and the innocent purchaser defense indicate
that PPOs could be liable for response costs
once they obtained knowledge of the release
and transferred ownership without disclos-
ing that information.ss In such a case, the
defendant would be liable under §
9607(a)(1).- This is consistent with the
premise that a PPO with knowledge of the
release is not a true PPO.
42 The term "contractual relationship," for the purpose of § 9607(b)(3) of this title includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring title
or possession, unless the real property on which the facility concerned is located was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on,
in, or at the facility, and one or more of the circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or
threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendantis a govemment entitywhich acquired the facility by escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the exercise of eminent domain
authority by purchase or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.
In addition to the foregoing, the defendant must establish that he has satisfied the requirements of § 9607(bX3Xa) and (b) of this title. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35).
43 Id.
44 See Ruhl, supra, note 30, at 1142.
45 Id.
46 "Nothing in this paragraph or in § 9607(b)(3) of this title shall diminish the liability of any previous owner or operator of such facility who would otherwise be liable under
this chapter. Notwithstanding this paragraph, if the defendant obtained actual knowledge of the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at such facility when the
defendant owned the real property and then subsequently transferred ownership of the property to another person without disclosing such knowledge, such defendant shall be
treated as liable under § 9607(a)(1) of this title and no defense under § 9607(b)(3) of this title shall be available to such defendant" 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C).
47 See Ruhi, supra note 30 at 1142.
48 Petersen Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp. at 1352.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Ruhl, supro, note 30, at 1143-44.
52 "Whenever practicable and in the public interest, as determined by the President, the President shall as promptly as possible reach a final settlement with a potentially
responsible party in an adrinistrative or civil action under § 9606 or 9607 of this title if such settlement involves only a minor portion of the response costs at the facility concemed,
and, in the judgment of the President, the conditions in either of the following subparagraph (A) or (B) are met-
(A) Both of the following are minimal in comparison to other hazardous substances at the facility.
(i) The amount of the hazardous substances contributed by that party to the facility.
(i) The toxic or other hazardous effects of the substances contributed by that party to the facility.
(B) The potentially responsible party -
(i) is the owner of the real property on or in which the facility is located,
(ii) did not conduct or permit the generation, transportation, storage, treatment or disposal of any hazardous substance at the facility; and
(ii) did not contribute to the release of a hazardous substance at the facility through any action or omission.
This subparagraph (B) does not apply if the potentially responsible party purchased the real property with actual or constructive knowledge that the property was used for the
generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous substance." 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (1988).
53 Rubt, supre, note 30, at 1143-44.
54 Id.
55 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35C) and 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(B).
53 Ruhl, supra, note 30, at 1143-44.
54 Id.
55 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35X)Q and 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g(1XB).
56 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(Q.
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With this ambiguous statutory language,
the courts are sharply divided: some holding
that disposal includes passive occurrences,
such as leaching, by the plain words of the
statute, others holding that passive events
cannot be disposal because such a definition
of disposal would be inconsistent with Con-
gressional intent and with other provisions of
CERCLA.
B) Conflicting Case Law
1) The RCRA Decisions
Before CERCLA was enacted, the EPA
tried to compel cleanup of severely contami-
nated sites under RCRA by enjoining per-
sons contributing to any "handling, storage,
treatment, transportation or disposal of any
solid waste or hazardous waste [that] may
present an imminent and substantial endan-
germent to health or the environment"57
RCRA, however, was designed for prospec-
tive injunctive relief. Accordingly, the EPA's
attempts met with only partial success."
CERCLA was enacted to close the holes left
by RCRA, and to provide a liability mecha-
nism for past generation of toxic waste.59
CERCLA provides for strict liability for re-
sponse costs with only limited defenses.60
Both RCRA and CERCLA require dis-
posal. For the purposes of this article,
"disposal" is the key definitional term, as
disposal must occur during the ownership of
interceding landowners for them to be liable
under CERCLA § 9607(a)(2). Both statutes
use the same disposal definition, which has
spawned litigation under both RCRA and
CERCLA.
In United States v. Price, the EPAsought
to compel cleanup of an abandoned landfill
from which hazardous chemicals were con-
taminating groundwater.6 1 The defendants
argued that they were not liable for response
costs because they did not engage in any
active disposal but rather purchased the
property after all dumping had occurred.62
The district court held that disposal could be
passive because "[tlhe gravamen of a § 7003
[RCRAlaction... is... thepresentimminent
hazard posed by the continuing disposal (i.e.
leaking) of contaminants . . ."6 Since the
PPOs were aware when they bought the land
that it had been used as a landfill, the court
held thePPOs liable because of their "studied
indifference to the hazardous condition.""
Thus, the court imposed a duty on buyers to
investigate or to accept the property as is,
complete with cleanup responsibilities."
In United States u. Waste Indus.", an-
other RCRA case, the Fourth Circuit dupli-
cated the reasoning of the Price court. The
district court in Waste Indus. held that
disposal required "active human conduct."67
The court of appeals, however, declined to
follow "a strained reading of that term limit-
ing its § 7003 meaning to active conduct
[which] would so frustrate the remedial pur-
pose of the Act as to make it meaningless.""
The statute was held to regulate not conduct
but "endangerments."69 The court relied on
Congress' inclusion of "leaking" within the
definition of disposal.70 The defendants in
Waste Industries, however, would have
been liable for the cleanup without this inclu-
sion because they collectively built, owned
and operated the contaminated landfill in
question.7'
Other RCRA cases also have held that
passive disposal is sufficient to trigger RCRA
liability for PPOs.n Commentators have
argued that courts interpreting RCRA were
straining the statute to fill a perceived need
for cleanup of hazardous wastes. However,
by the time the RCRA cases were decided,
Congress had enacted CERCLAto empower
the courts to order such cleanup.73 If these
RCRA cases had been decided before
CERCLA was enacted, Congress might not
have incorporated thecourt-expanded RCRA
"disposal" definition into CERCLA.74
2) CERCLA Cases
Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. u. Dow
Chem. Co. was the first case deciding the
PPO issue after CERCLA was enacted.'
The court granted a motion to dismiss a PPO
who had been an owner of the property after
Dow Chemical and others had disposed of
waste thereon.76 The court stated that all but
a "strained reading" of CERCLA dictated a
dismissal" for any "party who merely owned
the site at a previous point in time, who
neither deposited nor allowed others to de-
57 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1993). See generally Richard G. Stoll, RCRA versus CERCLA - Choice and Overlap, C778 AU-ABA 141 (1992).58 Ruhl, supra, note 30 at 1135.
59 See 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120; Joel Moskowitz, EumOrENTALLABRHY & REAL PROPaYTRANACnOus: Usy & PeAcncE 5(1989). For a comparisonof the factorstriggering liabilityunderCERCLA and RCRA, seeRichard G.Stoll,Hazardous Wastes, Superfund& ToxicSubstances. CosponsoredbytheEnvl. L Inst RCRAversusCERCLA
- Choice and Overlap, Oct. 29, 1992.
60 CERCLA provides that "[tjhe term 'liable' or 'liability' under this subchapter shall be construed to be the standard of liability which obtains under§ 1321 of Title 33 (CleanWater Act." 42 U.S.C.A § 9601(32) (West Supp. 1991). The standard under the Clean Water Act is strict liability. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). For
available defenses under CERCLA, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (West 1983).
61 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (1982).
62 Id. at 1070.
63 Id. See also Report on Hazardous Waste Disposal by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1979) (cited by the Price court at 1072.)
64 Price, 523 F. Supp. at 1073.
65 Id.
66 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984).
67 Id. at 164.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 164-65.
71 Id. at 161-62.
72 See, e.g., United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1399-1400 (D.N.H. 1985); United Statesv. VertracChem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870,885 (E.D. Ark.1980).
73 Ruhi, supra, note 30, at 1136.
74 Id.
75 14 Envn.. L REP. 20376 (C.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 840 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988).76 Id. at 20378-79.
77 Id. at 20378.
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posit hazardous wastes on the site."'
The PPO liability issue also was raised in
Emhart Indus., Inc. v. Duracell Int'l, Inc."
In that case, the current owner of a contami-
nated manufacturing plant sued Duracell,
the previous owner, for contribution of
cleanup costs."a The court held that the
continued leaking and seepage from earlier
spills constituted a release or threatened
release."' The court also stated that the
passive migration of chemicals might consti-
tute disposal.82 This holding was unneces-
sarily broad, however, as the court found
that because Duracell had engaged in active
dumping and spilling during its ownership, it
was engaged actively in the disposal of haz-
ardous waste.83 Thus, Duracell was not a
true ppO."4
In In re Hemingway Transport, Inc. v.
Kahn,' plaintiff sued the trustee in bank-
ruptcy for Hemingway, the former owner,
for recovery of response costs.M The court
held that hazardous chemical leaking alone
was sufficient to impose CERCLA liability
upon PPOs." Evidence indicated that al-
though Hemingway did not participate ac-
tively in the disposal, it knew of the contami-
nation during its ownership88 This knowl-
edge removes Hemingway from the cat-
egoryoftruePPOs; PPOs mustnot be aware
of nor contribute to the cortamination.
The PPO liability issue again was ad-
dressed inEcodyne Corp. v. Shah.'e During
its ownership of the property in question,
Ecodyne had built water tower tanks, using
wood treated with a hazardous chemical."
Ecodyne sold to Shah, who contractually
assumed responsibility for cleanup.91 Shah
later sold to another party.Y Ecodyne was
ordered to cleanup the property and brought
suit for contribution under CERCLA.93 The
district court dismissed Ecodyne's suit be-
cause allowing the definition of disposal to
include passive migration would conflict with
"the limited scope of § 9607(a)(2)."9 The
court read § 9607(a)(2) as "only providing an
action against prior owners or operators
who owned the site at the time the hazardous
substances were introduced into the environ-
ment."-s
The Court relied heavily on a statutory
interpretation to limit the definition of dis-
posal:
"The meaning of a word is or may
be known from the accompanying
words...In ascertaining what dis-
posal means, the Court looks at its
definitional components and finds
that these three nouns (discharge,
deposit, and injection) and four
gerunds (dumping, spilling, leak-
ing, and placing), when read to-
gether, all have in common the
idea that someone do something
with hazardous substances ... For
plaintiff solipsistically to read, for
example, "leaking" as meaning the
general migration of chemicals and,
as such, a disposal under §
9607(a)(2), renders not only the
definitional phrase of § 6903(3)
"into or on any land or water"
superfluous, but would also conflict
with the general structure of §
9607(a)."
Ecodyne, 718 F. Supp at 1457.
I n CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General
Corp., the district court held that "leaking"
fell within the definition of disposal.96 The
court went on to overrule a motion for
dismissal on the grounds that the plaintiff
had adequately stated a claim by alleging that
the defendant agreed to operate "purge
wells" to remove the hazardous waste, but
failed to do so.Y The court found that this
failure "caused or contributed to the spread
or migration of hazardous substances" and
that "this constitute[d) a 'disposal' and 're-
lease' under the statute." 3 Thus, again, the
defendant was not a true PPO.
I n In re Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc.,
another district court held that disposal re-
quires active conduct." Diamond Reo in-
volved a suit by a bankruptcy trustee to
collect for response costs incurred at the
debtor's business site. 00 At the time of their
ownership, the debtor operated an automo-
tive manufacturing plant on the property,
which included a number of underground
fuel storage tanks.'01 The court, agreeing
with Ecodyne, held that disposal must be
limited to active conduct. 102 "Otherwise, the
liability imposed by § 9607(a) could have
been drafted to simply include all owners or
operators in the chain of title subsequent to
the contamination."103 The court held that
"[wihile it would be financially desirable and
perhaps ethically correct to hold all owners
of record liable," CERCLA and its amend-
ments have "not only ends but also limits.
Born of compromise, laws such as CERCLA
and SARA do not pursue their ends to their
78 Id.
79 665 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Tenn. 1987).
80 Id. at 553-55.
81 Id. at 574. It is important here to remember the distinction between "release" and "disposal" under CERCLA. See supra, text accompanying notes 30-38.
82 Id. at 574.
83 Id.
84 See also Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1573 (5th Cir. 1988): "Thel definition of disposal does not limit disposal to a one-time
occurrence - there may be other disposals when hazardous materials are moved, dispersed, or released during landfill excavations and fillings."
85 108 B.R. 378 (D. Mass 1989).
86 Id. It should be noted that because Hemingway leased the property, he fell within the CERCLA definition of "owner" at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). Id. at 379, 382.
87 Id. at 382.
88 Id. at 381 (testimony of an employee of the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Agency that he discovered the barrels and reported their existence to Hemingway).
89 718 F. Supp. 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
90 Id. at 1455.
91 Id. at 1455, 1456.
92 Id. at 1456.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1457.
95 Id.
96 731 F. Supp. 783, 789 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
97 Id. at 788-89.
98 Id. at 789.
99 115 B.R. 559, 565 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
100 Id. at 561.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 566.
103 Id at 565.
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logical limits ... A court's job is to find and
enforce stopping points no less than to
implement other legislative choices."'104 The
court also noted that the third party defenses
of § 9607(b)(3) would be "rendered impo-
tent" if PPOs were held liable. 05
The split widened in The Stanley Works
v. Snydergeneral Corp.,o'0 in which the
district court refused to follow the Ecodyne
reasoning.'" The Stanley Works court,
relying on the precedent set under RCRA
cases, accepted plaintiff's arguments against
applying Ecodyne. The court, in adopting
plaintiff's argument, stated that it was consis-
tent with the legislative scheme to hold all
owners in the chain liable because all had
control over the contaminated property at
some time, whether or not they had knowl-
edge or fault.'"s Thus, the court denied the
defendants'motion forsummaryjudgment.o 9
The court agreed with the plaintiff's argu-
ment that Congress' purpose in enacting
CERCLA in its strict liability format would be
hampered by enforcing the "Ecodyneamend-
ment" to impose a fault system on past
owners, who purchased property after con-
taminants were introduced and during their
continued release." 0 The court disagreed
with the defendant's contention that con-
striing disposal to encompass passive mi-
gration would be to write the innocent pur-
chaserdefenseof § 9607(bX3)and§ 9601(35)
out of CERCLA.xx "While it is no doubt
more likely that the innocent purchaser de-
fense will succeed in circumstances involving
passive disposal, this will not always be the
case."112 While the facts in Stanley Works
are unclear from the court's decision, it
appears that defendants were either owners
and operators at the time of active disposal
or were current owners. "3 Thus, defendants
appear not to have been true PPOs and, the
court need not have reached the question of
whether disposal required active conduct.
I n Snediker Developers Ltd. Partner-
ship v. Evans,"4 however, the district court
held that passive migration is not disposal
under CERCLA."15 The court refused to
impose cleanup liability on all owners in the
chain of title, holding that "if the drafters of
CERCLA had intended such a far reaching
consequence, they would have said so ex-
plicitly."" 6 The court then granted the
PPOs' motion for summary judgment." 7
The above decisions indicate that the
question of liability for PPOs is unsettled,
largely because it is ambiguous both in its
origin and its development, and because the
relevant provisions of CERCLA have no
dear congressional intent or Supreme Court
precedent.
UW. INSTANT DECISION
The Fourth Circuit in Nurad held that it
was bound by the statutory language, clear
precedent, and "the fundamental purposes
of CERCLA" to hold that passive migration
is included within the definition of disposal
under 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).s8
Since the definition of disposal under §
6903(3) includes words which "readily admit
to a passive component" (i.e. leaking, spill-
ing), the court refused "arbitrarily [tol depriv[e]
these words of their passive element by
imposing a requirement of active participa-
tion as a prerequisite to liability."" 9
The court followed the holding of Waste
Indus., a 1984 Fourth Circuit case which
arose under RCRA, in finding that disposal
need not involve active conduct.120 The
Nuraddistrict court had held that the Waste
Indus. definition had been necessary to close
a loophole in RCRA's statutory scheme and
"preserve the EPA's ability to demand
deanup."' 2' The Fourth Circuit, however,
refused to distinguish the RCRA policy and
context from that of CERCLA, stating that
both were designed to encourage cleanup of
hazardous wastes, and that requiring an
affirmative act to impose lability would equally
frustrate the policy of both.122
The Fourth Circuit held that accepting the
district court's requirement of active conduct
for disposal would "reward indifference to
environmental hazards" by imposing liability
on those who undertake to clean up the
contamination.123 Further, current owners
who did not create or contribute to the
contamination would bear a substantial por-
104 Id. at 565-566 (quoting Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1988)).105 Id. at 566.
106 781 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Cal. 1990).
107 Id. at 663-64.
108 "The owners of the property at the time active disposal occurred are liable without any regard to whether they actively participated in the disposal; the current ownerof the property is liable without regard to state of knowledge or fault It is certainly more consistent with this legislative scheme than not to include within the sweep of liabilitypast owners who owned the property (and thus had control over it -a common element linking all of these categories of liability) during a period in which the property was activelydischarging contaminants into the environment." Id. (quoting plaintiffs brief).
109 Id. at 659.
110 Id. at 663 (summarizing plaintiff's brief).
111 Id. at 664.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 661. Plaintiff's First Claim for Relief in the Amended Complaint alleged in pertinent part: "31. The disposal, dispersal, discharge, migration, leaching, leaking
and/or release of TCE and other hazardous substances that occurred at the Sunstar Parcel between 1961 and the present, as alleged above, constitutes "releases" of hazardous
substances under § 101(22) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). 33. Defendants... are jointly and severally liable for the necessary costs of response and remedying the releases
alleged above because they were the owners or operators of the Sunstar Parcel, in fact or by operation of law, at the time hazardous substances were disposed of and releasedthere or because they are the present owners and operators of the Sunstar Parcel or SSP Parcel." Id.114 773 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
115 Id. at 988-89. The court distinguished CPC Int'l and Emhart Indus. as not being true PPO cases. Id. at 989 n.6.116 Id. at 989.
117 Id. at 990.
118 Nurad. 966 F.2d at 844-45.
119 Id. at 845.
120 Id. at 845 (citing Waste Indus., 734 F.2d at 164-65.)
121 Nurad, 22 Envtl. L Rep. at 20087.
122 "Mhe aim of both RCRA and CERCLA is to encourage the cleanup of hazardous waste conditions. Whether the context is one of prospective enforcement of hazardous
waste removal under RCRA or an action for reimbursement of response costs under CERCLA, a requirement conditioning liability upon affirmative human participation incontamination equally frustrates the statutory purpose." Id. at 845.
123 "lAln owner could avoid liability simply by standing idle while an environmental hazard festers on his property. .. A more conscientious owner who undertakes the task
of cleaning up the environmental hazard would, on the other hand, be liable as the current owner of the facility, since "disposal" is not a part of the current owner liability scheme
under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aX1). The district courts view thus introduces the anomalous situation where a current owner, such as Nurad, who never used the storage tanks couldbear a substantial share of the cleanup costs, while a former owner who was similarly situated would face no liability at all. A CERCLA regime which rewards indifference to
environmental hazards and discourages voluntary efforts at waste cleanup cannot be what Congress had in mind." Id. at 845-46 (citations omitted).
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tion of the cleanup costs while similarly
situated former owners would not.124
Finally, the court of appeals held that to
define disposal as involving active conduct
would violate the strict liability format of
CERCLA.12s The court declined to "engraft
onto the statute additional prerequisites to
the reimbursement of response costs which
Congress did not place there."'26
IV. COliENT
In holding that disposal includes passive
migration, the Fourth Circuit overlooked
several indications to the contrary.
Although the statutory language of
CERCLA conspicuously includes "leaking"
within its incorporated definition of disposal,
this may be due to the fact that the statute
was enacted as the product of apparent
congressional compromisebefore theRCRA
disposal definition was given its expansive
reading. Admittedly, CERCLA is no model
of statutory clarity.127 Further, as discussed
previously, defining disposal to include pas-
sive migration would eviscerate the innocent
purchaser defense and renderthe de minimis
settlement provision ineffectual and discrimi-
natory against PPOs and in favor of present
owners of contaminated property.128
The Nurad court appropriately was con-
cemed with removing disincentives to pri-
vate action for environmental cleanup.129
The court failed to consider, however, that
the innocent purchaser defense is never
available to a party who has actual knowl-
edge of the contamination during its owner-
ship.130 Further, CERCLA provides criminal
sanctions for those who fail to report a
"release" promptly."'3 CERCLA also en-
courages, and practically requires, investiga-
tion of possible contamination before pur-
chasing land, thus making transfer of con-
taminated land more onerous.132
Finally, the prior cases holding that dis-
posal includes passive migratiori are ambigu-
ous in their reasoning and clearly distinguish-
able from the case inNurad. United States
u. Price and In re Hemingway Transport,
Inc. both involved defendants with actual
knowledge of the release, removing them
from the category of true PPOs and making
them liable for response costs under §
9607(a)(1).'3 The remaining cases holding
that disposal can be passive unnecessarily
reached that conclusion, as defendants in
those cases actively engaged in disposal or
negligently omitted to remove waste which
they had contracted to remove." Thus, the
Nurad court was not bound to follow the
prior Fourth Circuit decision in Waste In-
dustries, because it fell into this second
category of cases.s
V. CONCLUSION
"Particularly where the imposition of li-
ability is based on public policy rather than
any conception of fairness or culpability, the
ultimate question for the court must be not
the end but the intended limit."3' Such is the
case with CERCLA generally, and particu-
larly with the question of PPO liability.137 If
true PPOs can be held liable for contamina-
tion which they did not create or to which
they did not contribute and of which they had
no actual knowledge, owners and purchas-
ers of property are placed in a precarious and
unenviable position.
If the language of CERCLA is to be inter-
preted strictly, "disposal" under CERCLA
must include the passive conduct found in
the RCRA definition. The only option avail-
able to PPOs seeking to limit liability would
be to consider passive disposal in mitigation
of damages. Notably, if PPOs are held liable
under § 9607(a), the innocent purchaser
defense and the de minimis settlement pro-
vision should be expanded to incorporate a
PPO so that PPOs have the same defenses
and settlement options as present owners.
While a clear congressional directive or
Supreme Court decision is needed to clear
up the uncertainties regarding PPO liability,
neither is immediately forthcoming. Until
this area acquires additional definition, pas-
sive past owners of land will continue to be
subject to liability for having done nothing.
124 Id. at 845.
125 Id. at 846.
126 Id.
127 See Artesian Water Co. v. Govemment of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988).
128 See supra, text accompanying notes 39-56.
129 Nurad, 966 F.2d at 845-46.
130 42 U.S.C. §9601(35)(C) (1986). See, generally, Judith G. Tracy, Beyond Caveat Emptor: Disclosure to Buyers of Contaminated Land, 10 STn. Ewn.. L J. 169
(1991).
131 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1980).
132 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35XB) (1986). See Petersen Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp. at 1353.
133 See supro, text accompanying notes 61-65 and text accompanying notes 85-88 for a discussion of these cases.
134 Stanley Works, 781 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (defendants were owners or operators at the time of active disposal or were current owners); CPC Int'l, 731 F. Supp.
783 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (defendants failed to operate "purgewells" to remove waste as they had contracted to do), Em hart Indus., 665 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Tenn. 1987) (defendants
actively disposed of chemical manufacturing waste); Waste Indus., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984) (defendants owned, operated and directed the construction of a contaminated
landfill at the time it was used as such).
135 734 F.2d 159.
136 Petersen Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp. at 1353.
137 A recent district court case unwittingly provides two options to the question of PPO liability. In Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F. Supp 1309 (D. N.J. 1992),
the New Jersey district court issued a self-contradictory opinion which held that. (1) passive disposal could not be raised as a defense to CERCLA liability, but was relevant to the
mitigation of damages, Id. at 1325-26; and (2) the amount of harm caused by each defendant should be considered at the initial liability phase and not at the contribution phase
because 'precisely relative degrees of liability" are involved. Id. at 1329-30. It should be noted that the party asserting the defenses was not a true PPO, but rather was the current
owner of the contaminated property. Id. at 1314.
In support of its second holding, the court cited the divisibility of harm theory set out in § 433 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. at 1329-30. This allows apportionment
of damages when (1) there are distinct harms or (2) a reasonable basis exists for determining the contribution of each cause to the total harm. Id. The court noted that establishing
which disposals were solely attributable to one defendant was insufficient without also showing which releases, threatened releases or response costs were attributable to those
disposals. Id. at 1330. The court concluded that if the harm is divisible, each defendant should be liable only for that portion of the harm which is attributable to that defendant.
Id.
ForotherrecentcasesdiscussingNumd,see, e.g., JoslynMfg. Co. v. T.L James&Co., Inc., Civ.A. No.87-2054,1993 WL333619, at*4(W.D. La.July8, 1993)(interpreting
Nurad as requiring active leaking of storage tanks, holding that owners at the time of leaching caused by rainfall are not liable for that reason alone); HR WSys., Inc., v. Washington
Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318, 340 (D. Md. 1993) (approving of Nurad and noting the innocent purchaser defense); The Reading Co. u. City of Philadelphia, 155 B.R.
890, 898 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (distinguishing passive release from release through leaking or spilling).
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